Iran History and Military


EQNEEDF Note:  I might add, Iran declared WAR on the U.S. in 1980. Americans don’t want war with Iran in my humble view, but if war be are future, then lets shut Iran down militarily, pulling the governments teeth out and support millions who what freedom in the Republic of Iran.


If you’re an Iranian and you don’t want to kill me, join me in a common cause of peace, ignoring your enemies I guess provided there peaceful to you. Support peace first and then proudly embrace your religion that’s viewed as an ideology to me because you don’t in a large way support peace.


You see, to be indifferent is ok, but to get to that step in life you must first be peaceful.


I don’t want to spend much time on the CIA website and since I want to study Iran’s military weaknesses and assets, the following CIA Report and other information reported hereto to include Syria history was compiled and presented for anyone to view, although the web site that houses this information was built by the EQNEEDF for Batman47.


It seems to me the Iranian People need to step up secretly at first. There are many ways to communicate on the internet.


To know an estimation of the number of Iranians interested in peace, and if you’re an Iranian amongst others who can keep secrets, something the American government can’t do, at the possibility of death if caught, plan a path of departure if you live near any targets, military assets myself and others are figuring out.


 Of course the average person must use google search while governments have other assets.


Now, what will be, will be. You can postpone action in hopes for a reaction but in the end, only peace through strength will prevail.


The Iranian government has chosen a path of destruction and planners must now plan for an aerial bombardment, aircraft and ship and submarines missile(s) attack.


My fellow Iranians whom desire peace, rally the cry of peace by sounding out in any way you can, and let Romney and the American people here your cry of peace.


War or Peace


It’s time to change the mission in the Middle East to Iran and Syria and there buddies, Israel's enemies. Our troops in are in danger unless there prepared to take on Iran which will be a war of bombs and missiles which means there are 74,000 to many troops abroad involved in OEF.


Under Obama, Afghanistan will one day be engulfed by the Taliban.


Israel would have to attack Iran first before the U.S. would get involved and then only if America gets Hit some where in the world or Israel is over ran.


Congress and the Senate would declare war if America is attacked or troops abroad, etc. are attacked, while America through treaties would have to defend Israel in a code red response request forcing the President to respond without congressional approval rather quickly, consulting with congress ASAP.


The direction of any President before Obama would be advance preparation and joint cooperation, flying show of force flights of squadrons from the U.S. and allies declared to the world as training missions with Israel.


Of course before Obama, Citizens like me would not have had to tell a President what to do in order to guarantee the U.S. and Israel's national security.


Attacking Iran’s Nuclear Power Plants to me are secondary targets if at all since wiping out all delivery military assets, aircraft, ships, tanks, military bases, runways, military government buildings within cities, etc., would be necessary unless you want reprisals military and a long drawn out war.


If you remove Iran’s teeth, there bite is lessoned.


If America follows Israel's move without preparation or placing forward assets in areas for logistics support, a war that could be quick and swift in conjunction with aerial assets rather them ground forces deployed, accompanied with naval assets would be prolonged.


If Iran wants to buy new aircraft from China or Russia after a several week bombardment destroys them, go ahead, let them rebuild if there week economy can afford weapons without starving there people, while accruing new military assets to the extinct they have now, would take a decade at least, so let them and when they rebuild there military, destroy it again until the Iranian people decide to live peacefully and stop financing Israel's enemies whom themselves and not Israel have declared Israel there enemy.


My first target would be all naval vessels, hunting down there few submarines and sinking them.

The fact is, fighting a war with limits cause’s casualties.


The total alienation of all military assets of Iran must be on the table or just let Iran get a nuclear weapon.

Since the President of the U.S. won’t say it, I will: Killing 500 nuclear scientist and destroying Iran’s Nuclear Power Plant will bring America into war, so working with Israel to destroy every military asset is on the table and preparation behind closed doors has begun.


And if that’s not true, then the CIC of America should resign and go play golf.


Israel's need of security is necessary for economic development and foreign investment as well as security.

President Obama’s idea of America’s resolved has left Israel to initiate action against Iran alone.


The U.S. Navy however is involved in a large exercise in the Middle East with allied ships but was not announced as a show of force.


My advice to Israel is simple, Iran has declared war on you along time ago, so go on the offense and destroy Iran’s Navy and every military delivery asset capable of launching a missile, build a fence around Israel, defend the skies of Israel and destroy as many aircraft as possible flying from the Persian Gulf and with no aircraft carriers, Boeing 707 Tankers will be necessary or long range bombers over land if the Nuclear Power Plants are the only goal. Another aerial route over land would require Jordon and Iraq and or Saudi Arabia to give permission for over flights. Iraq I don’t think would get behind Israel unless America pressured them to allow over flights, yet even then with Obama in office, I doubt it.


Jordon or Saudi Arabia might allow over flight missions. The British Navy aircraft carriers could protect the refueling tankers for Israel's attack squadrons if they chose the Persian Gulf route or even forward deployed attack aircraft in countries friendly to Israel in the Indian Ocean or North Arabian Sea Region. Diego Garcia comes to mind as a logistical base.


If I was Israel's general, those rockets would have been destroyed along time ago because I would have launched raids into suspected areas until I found them.


The military uncertainties of an attack on Iran

By Michael O’Hanlon, Special to CNN

Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow at Brookings and author of The Wounded Giant: America’s Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity. The views expressed are his own.


Military strikes against the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, together with other possible targets related to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, could last for a single day and single sortie – or they could last for several days or even weeks. The latter possibility of course implies American participation too, and probably requires the use of air bases in one or more Gulf states as well, given the likely U.S. interest in using stealthy planes that at present don’t fly from aircraft carriers (though B-2 bombers could fly from Diego Garcia, for example).


So what is the likely effectiveness, and what are the likely risks, of each possible approach? I’d argue that there is there is significant unpredictability about how well an air campaign by Israel in particular would work – not least in terms of how much of the existing Iranian nuclear infrastructure it would destroy, and how long it might take Iran to recover (and that’s even leaving aside the huge issue of how Iran might retaliate).


First, though, it’s worth reviewing some basic information on previous, somewhat analogous, air campaigns, as well as the nature and locations of Iran’s nuclear facilities.


In Operation Desert Fox, in 1998, the United States and Britain used 650 aircraft sorties and 415 cruise missile strikes, against 97 targets (11 WMD facilities, 18 command and control, 8 Republican Guard barracks, six airfields, 19 key regime sites such as Special Republican Guard barracks). They were reasonably effective. But of course we had been monitoring Iraq closely for nearly a decade by this point, on the ground and in the air, and Saddam Hussein had already abandoned his nuclear aspirations, we now know.

Or consider the Kosovo campaign of the spring of 1999. In the first month of the campaign, daily strikes averaged 5 against air defenses, 2.5 against lines of communication, and 4 against command and control (for the rest of the campaign, the respective figures were 3, 5, and nearly 7). Total sorties per day averaged 250 in the first week, and close to 500 in April. This campaign had a much different purpose, but underscored the difficulty of achieving major goals with a limited number of air strikes.  Initial forecasts of a quick Milosevic capitulation, in Washington and elsewhere, were badly off.


All this suggests that a single-day air campaign against a large nuclear infrastructure would be quite unusual in the annals of modern air warfare. To be sure, the United States sometimes uses more assets than perhaps required simply because it can. But typical attacks last several days and involve hundreds of sorties. Often, those attacks that were originally expected to take just a few days take weeks, as well. Nuclear facilities, meanwhile, are typically quite large, meaning that a planeload or two of ordnance will quite often be far short of what’s required.


Recent improvements in precision strike technology and GPS guidance make it quite possible that we could successfully drop numerous munitions into the same hole, digging deeper and deeper, even in bad weather and even if dust and other debris would make laser guidance challenging. In addition, it appears likely that we have tested this methodology fairly carefully, and it appears likely the Israelis could carry it out too.  Even in a single-sortie attack, successive planes reaching a target could perhaps therefore execute such a mission.


However, air defenses could be quite problematic for non-stealthy planes and perhaps even for stealthy planes, since the locations of attack can be anticipated extremely well.  This challenge would place a greater premium on a larger attack force, to allow attacks against radars and command centers and SAM launchers, and argues against the single-sortie mission. Recent precedents suggest that dozens of bombs could be needed to deal with an air defense system, especially since Iran’s enrichment facilities aren’t near its borders.


In addition, bomb damage assessment could be challenging. We may be able to dig deep with bombs, but we may not know if we were successful right away. Protracted examination of the site after initial strikes might be needed to confirm if any activity continued at those locations, meaning that the need for follow-on strikes might not be immediately apparent. This is especially true at the second uranium enrichment site near Qom. Again, this would be a downside of the single-sortie option.


All that said, we need to remain cognizant of the risks of even the prolonged attack scenario as well – going well beyond the well-known risks of Iranian retaliation, even greater internal Iranian consensus on the desirability of going nuclear after the attack, and the likely weakening of international sanctions after the attack as well. There could be a third enrichment site that we fail to attack simply because we don’t know it currently exists. The Iranians may bring in a group of civilians to “inspect” the site of the first attack, making follow-on waves difficult with the use of such human shields. (This would be risky but much less dangerous than how the regime used its own young soldiers in the Iran-Iraq war.) Air defenses could be repaired and/or relocated as well, while any attack involving hundreds of sorties or more would very likely involve the loss of one or more airplanes due to Iranian defensive action or simple aircraft malfunction.


We frequently talk pseudo-scientifically about the likelihood of a one to two year delay in Iran’s program after such a strike. I believe the range is more like 6 months to 3 or 4 years, given how hard it would be to predict the damage to Qom, as well as other uncertainties such as the possible existence of other enrichment sites.


All this means that there’s greater uncertainty in the outcome of an Israeli or U.S. air campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities than frequently appreciated, whether it is carried out quickly or over a period of days or even weeks.


(This article may be copyrighted. This article was posted without permission of author as an educational tool and every American should read it).


Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force


The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) (Persian: نیروی هوایی ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران‎ ​) is the aviation branch of the of the Iranian armed forces.


Israel Map


As you can see, Iran is a fair distance from Israeli.

Israeli Air Force B707 tanker refueling an F-15I


Let's assume that Iran has exhausted the world’s patience over its “peaceful nuclear energy” research program - a program most analysts believe is a cover for a nuclear weapons program. Israel has indicated in clear terms that it will not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. What are Israel's options to derail the program?


Most analysts agree that Israel does not have the capability to strike all of the sites associated with the program - estimates range between 12 and more than 20 locations. With limited power projection capabilities, Israeli intelligence analysts will determine the critical portions of the program - the key elements that if destroyed will slow down the effort. In 1981, the Israeli air force successfully crippled the Iraqi nuclear program with a daring daylight air raid on the key element of that program – the French-built Osirak reactor at At-Tuwaythah, just south of Baghdad. The single most critical element In the Iranian program is thought to be the centrifuge facility at Natanz (also known as the Esfahan enrichment facility).


 Natanz, Iran - Click image for larger view
Natanz, Iran


The Natanz facility is a challenging target. The heart of the facility is the centrifuge area, located in an underground, hardened structure. The Iranians are fully aware of Israeli capabilities and no doubt have studied what the Israelis did to the Iraqi program a quarter century ago. They are also aware of the demonstrated capability of the American-made precision-guided penetrating munitions ("bunker busters") in the Israeli inventory. The Iranian program has been dispersed all over the country; the facilities have been built with American and Israeli capabilities in mind and are protected by modern Russian air defense systems.

Aside from the difficult nature of the target itself is its geographic location in relation to Israel. The straight-line distance between Israel and Natanz is almost 1000 miles. (At-Tuwaythah was only 600 miles). Since the countries do not share a common border, Israeli aircraft or missiles must fly through foreign - and hostile - airspace to get to the target.

The least risky method of striking Natanz is with Israel's medium range ballistic missiles, the Jericho II or III. Details on the exact capabilities of these systems are unknown, but it is believed that the Israeli missiles can reach Natanz. However, to travel that far, the missiles will have a limited warhead weight, probably less than 1000 pounds. It is doubtful that these warheads will be able to penetrate far enough underground to achieve the desired level of destruction. That points to an attack by the Israeli air force's American-made fighter-bomber aircraft as the most likely option. The Israelis have 25
F-15I Ra'am (Thunder) and about 30 F-16I Sufa (Storm) jets.


Israeli Air Force F-15I

Israeli Air Force F-15I


How will the aircraft fly from their bases in Israel to a target located 200 miles inside Iran? There are two realistic ways to get there – either through Saudi Arabia or Iraq, possibly even using Jordanian airspace as well. Either route is a one-way trip of about 1200 miles. Even though Turkey and Israel have had a defense agreement since 1996, using Turkish airspace is not likely politically and would require the attacking aircraft to fly over 1000 miles inside Iranian airspace. It is also doubtful that the Israelis would jeopardize operational security by consulting with the Turks.


 Possible Flight Routes


The Saudi Arabia option (red). The strike aircraft depart southern Israel, enter Saudi airspace from the Gulf of ‘Aqabah or Jordan, fly 800 miles of Saudi airspace to the Persian Gulf and then 300 miles into Iran. Although the Israelis traversed Saudi airspace when they attacked the Iraqi facility in 1981, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have since significantly upgraded their air defense capabilities and share information with each other.


Since the Israeli air force does not operate stealth aircraft, there is a reasonable expectation that at some point the aircraft will be detected over Saudi Arabia, either by ground based radar or the AWACS airborne radar platforms. Whether Saudi defenses could - or would - be able to stop the Israelis is uncertain. Perhaps the Saudis would turn a blind eye and claim ignorance - after all, a nuclear-armed Iran is a potential threat to the Kingdom as well.


The Iraq option (blue). The strike aircraft depart southern Israel, cross 300 to 400 miles of Saudi airspace or a combination of Jordanian and Saudi airspace, and enter Iraqi airspace as soon as possible, continue across 500 miles of Iraq to the Persian Gulf and then on to the target. Entering Iran from Iraqi airspace would create too much of political firestorm. As it is, the use of Iraqi airspace will require the cooperation of the United States. Although Iraq is a sovereign nation, its skies are controlled by the American military. That said, allowing Israeli aircraft to ingress from Iraq is likely out of the question.


Either of these options carries the risk that once the actual attack on the facility is made, the viability of the return route is in jeopardy – all forces in the area will be on alert. The planners may opt to go to the target one way and back home via another.


The limiting factor in Israeli planning is the great distance to the target. Can Israel’s fighter-bombers conduct this mission without refueling? Combat radius - the distance an aircraft can fly and return without refueling - is difficult to calculate, and depends on weapons payload, external fuel tanks, mission profile, etc. It is even more difficult when dealing with Israeli aircraft because they will not release performance data on their assets.


The best "guestimate" of the combat radius of the F-15I and F-16I, outfitted with conformal fuel tanks, two external wing tanks and a decent weapons load, is almost 1000 miles. Either of the two possible flight routes above is about 200 miles further than that. To make up for the shortfall, the aircraft could be fitted with an additional external fuel tank, but this will require a reduction in the weapons load. Given the accuracy of the weapons in the Israeli inventory, that might not be problematic. However, if the aircraft are detected and intercepted, the pilots will have to jettison the tanks in order to engage their attackers. Dropping the tanks will prevent the aircraft from reaching their target.


Air refueling. This raises the question of air refueling? This is a limitation for the Israelis. While Israel has a large air force, its focus has been on the Arab countries that surround it. In recent years, it has sought the capability to project power against a target over 1000 miles away. To do this, Israel has acquired five B707 tanker aircraft. However, the tankers would have to refuel the fighters in hostile airspace. The B707 is a large unarmed aircraft and would be very vulnerable to air defenses.


Looking at the two scenarios, air refueling over Saudi Arabia (red route) would be very risky. It would have to be done at low altitude to evade detection and will probably be at night. Using Iraqi airspace (blue route) will be somewhat less difficult as altitude will not be an issue.


Of course, the tankers would have to get to Iraqi airspace and back. The use of Turkish airspace for the tanker aircraft to enter Iraq is probably not an option for the same reasons that it is not an option for the fighters – political sensitivities on the part of the Turks and operational security considerations on the part of the Israelis.


Israeli B707 refuels F-15I fighter-bombers


Another possibility is American cooperation – allow the Israelis to stage their tankers from an American air base in Iraq. These tankers could fly to Iraq though international airspace around the Arabian Peninsula and over the Persian Gulf. It would be too far for them to return to Israel without landing to refuel, otherwise the Israelis could refuel the fighters over the Gulf. American participation? There are other possibilities, from allowing Israeli fighters to land and refuel at U.S.-controlled bases in Iraq, to having U.S. Air Force tankers refuel the Israeli aircraft over Iraq. A diplomatic nightmare, maybe, but certainly a military possibility.


Theoretically, the Israelis could do this, but at great risk of failure. If they decide to attack Natanz, they will have to inflict sufficient damage the first time - they probably will not be able to mount follow-on strikes at other facilities. When all the analyses are done, there is only one military capable of the sustained widespread air operations required to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons research program - the United States. Again, a diplomatic nightmare, but certainly a military possibility.


(Thanks to Colonel Rick Pyatt, USAF-Ret for his assistance on this article.) Posted by: Rick Francona


The shah's air force had more than 450 modern combat aircraft, including top-of-the-line F-14 Tomcat fighters and about 5,000 well-trained pilots. By 1979 the air force, numbering close to 100,000 personnel, was by far the most advanced of the three services and among the most impressive air forces in the developing world. Reliable information on the air force after the Revolution was difficult to obtain, but it seems that by 1987 a fairly large number of aircraft had been cannibalized for spare parts.


A total of 14 air bases are currently operational: Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Chan Bahar, Dezful, Doshan Tapeh (Tehran), Ghaleh Morghi (Tehran), Hamadan, Isfahan, Mashhad, Mehrabad (Tehran), Shiraz, Tabriz and Zahedan. Soviet-made aircraft are distributed throughout the country to fufill mission roles of ground attack, transport, training and interception. Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Dezful, Hamadan, Tabriz and Mehrabad are the centers for ground attack squadrons. Shiraz is the home of the interceptor squadron. It also provides training along with, Mehrabad, Doshan Tapeh and Isfahan. Shiraz also houses the transport squadron.


Air Force Equipment


IIAF Imperial Iranian Air Force


IIAF, Imperial Iranian Air Force, Iran, Iranian Aircraft, History of Iran, Iranian Aviation, This is ... History of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, IIAF, Golden Crown, Iran, Iranian Aircraft, History


Iran Defence Forum


IRAN's National Security Forum 


Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force


The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) (Persian: نیروی هوایی ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران‎ ​) is the aviation branch of the of the Iranian armed forces.


These CIA reports change so don’t rely on those I’ve posted if you’re writing an article. Always review like I do, that’s why my work of authorship is accurate.




Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 86-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations have been strained since a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and held it until 20 January 1981. During 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces between 1987 and 1988. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world and remains subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and its nuclear weapons ambitions. Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, through the control of unelected institutions, prevented reform measures from being enacted and increased repressive measures. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud. The UN Security Council has passed a number of resolutions (1696 in July 2006, 1737 in December 2006, 1747 in March 2007, 1803 in March 2008, and 1835 in September 2008 and 1929 in June 2010) calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and comply with its IAEA obligations and responsibilities. Resolutions 1737, 1477, 1803 and 1929 subject a number of Iranian individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs to sanctions. Additionally, several Iranian entities are subject to US sanctions under Executive Order 13382 designations for proliferation activities and EO 13224 designations for support of terrorism. In mid-February 2011, opposition activists conducted the largest antiregime rallies since December 2009, spurred by the success of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Protester turnout probably was at most tens of thousands and security forces were deployed to disperse protesters. Additional protests in March 2011 failed to elicit significant participation largely because of the robust security response, although discontent still smolders.


Iran's Present Military Strength and Israel’s Air Strike Capabilities


The evolution of: The Iranian airline industry

Shooting Down Iran Air Flight 655 [IR655]
Gathered & Edited By: Shapour Ghasemi, 2004


Iran's Procurement and Defense Production/ Research & Development Program

An overview of Iran's Defense Production and Research & Development programs along with Procurement.


CIA Fact Book on Iran


Iran’s Army


Iran has become the third country in the Middle East to build main battle tanks (MBTs). Until recently, Israel was the only country in the area able to build an MBT, with its Merkava. Egypt has also begun building the US General Dynamics Land Systems M1A1 MBT. The army's aviation unit, whose main operational facilities were located at Esfahan, was largely equipped with United States aircraft, although some helicopters were of Italian manufacture. In 1986 army aviation operated some 65 light fixed-wing aircraft, but its strength lay in its estimated 320 combat helicopters, down from 720 in 1980.


MILNET Brief - The Iranian Conventional Forces - 2/18/2005


"Iran is now the only regional military power that poses a significant conventional military threat to Gulf stability.  Iran has significant capabilities for asymmetric warfare, and poses the additional threat of proliferation.  There is considerable evidence that it is developing both a long-range missile force and a range of weapons of mass destruction.  It has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown.  The discoveries made by the IAEA since 2002 indicate that it is likely Iran will continue to covertly seek nuclear weapons."


Iran has some 540,000 men under arms and over 350,000 reserves.  They include 120,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards trained fro land and naval asymmetrical warfare.  Iran's military also includes holdings of 1,613 main battle tanks, 21,600 other armored fighting vehicles, 3,200 artillery weapons, 306 combat aircraft, 60 attack helicopters, 3 submarines, 59 surface combatants, and 10 amphibious ships"” (Ref. From Center for Strategic and International Studies - By Anthony H. Cordesman).


Iranian Military


Commander of the Iranian Army


Iran’s Army Air Force fully prepared for unequaled battle: Cmdr.


    A senior Iranian commander has scoffed at the military threats against the Islamic Republic, saying Iran’s Army Air Force (IRAF) is fully prepared for an unequalled battle. “The helicopters of Iran's Army have been equipped with systems that will enable them to compete in an unequalled battle,” Commander of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan told IRNA on Sunday. He added that the Army’s helicpoters have been improved in technical and tactical terms to prepare them for the unequalled battle.


    The Iranian commander emphasized that the IRAF units have great power and will strongly defend the country. In recent years, Iran has made important breakthroughs in its defense sector and attained self-sufficiency in producing important military equipment and systems. Tehran has repeatedly clarified that its military might is merely based on the nation's defense doctrine of deterrence and poses no threat to other countries” (Ref. SF/HJL/MA).



    * Abu Musa - small docking facility on the island's west end; located near Abu Musa


    * Al-Farsiyah
    * Bandar Beheshti (Chah Bahar) - port and base facilites in the Gulf of Oman
    * Bandar-e Abbas - naval HQ and home to naval airbase
    * Bandar-e Anzali - once training base and now home to Caspian Sea Fleet (patrol boats, minesweepers)
    * Bandar-e Khomeini - small sheltered base located near the border with Iraq
    * Bandar-e Mahshahr - small based located near Bandar-e Khomeini
    * Bushehr - repair and storage facility in the Persian Gulf; home to Navy Technical


Supply Center and R&D center

    * Halul (an oil platform)

    * Jask - small based located across from Oman and UAE in southeastern Iran at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz
    * Khark - small base on the island and located northwest of Bushehr
    * Khorramshahr - former naval HQ; now repair and shipbuilding facilities
    * Larak - small base on the island and near Bandar-e Abbas
    * Kharg Island - base in the Straits of Hormuz; home to hovercraft fleet
    * Noshahr - not a base, but home to Iman Khomeini University for Naval Science (naval staff college)
    * Qeshm - small port facility near Kharg and Bandar-e Abbas
    * Shahid Rajaie
    * Sirri - island port facility located in the Persian Gulf and across from UAE


user posted image


Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Sepah e Pasdaran, Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution






10 Launchers


45 Launchers






150 Launchers


30 Launchers


15 Launchers

fire units





HQ-7 / FM-80


FIM-92 Stinger









The new surface-to-sea missile is equipped with remote-control and searching systems, the state-run television reported Tuesday.,2933,190462,00.html


Islamic Republic of Iran Navy Aviation

Multirole Jet Fighters



Ballistic Missiles


Other land attack missiles are of great concern as well, Iran fielding a total of three SCUD derivatives and 2 more longer range missiles on the way. 


CSS-8; SCUD-B; SCUD-C; Shahab-3 & 4; Taepo Dong 1 & 2 Iranian Silkworm missile


Missile Craft

Houdong: 10
Kaman (Combattante II): 14


Coastal Patrol

Parvin: 3
Kaivan: 2


Inshore Patrol

Zafar: 3
Cat-14: 5
PBF: 55
MIG-G-1900: 10
MIG-S-1800: 20
Peykaap (IPS-16): 10
Tir (IPS-18): 10
Hovercraft: 14
Submersibles: 3
Peykaap Fast attack craft: 74
Misc small crafts: 200+


Hejaz LST: 2


Shahrokh MSC: 1
292 MSC: 2
Riazi (Cape): 2


Hengam LST: 4
Iran Hormuz 24 LST: 3
Iran Horum 21 LST: 3
Fouque LSL: 3
Landing Craft, Tank: 6
BH.7 Logistic Support Hovercraft: 6
SR.N6 Hovercraft



Kharg: 1
Bandar Abbad: 2
Delvar: 7 (Also minelayers)
Hendijan: 13
Kangan: 4
AT: 1
Training Craft: 2


Air Forces


The Iranian air forces are well aged and in poor maintenance.  While mechanical units can be repaired with indigenous labor, Iranian ability to remanufacture avionics is limited.  This does not keep them from trying.  However, it is the CSIS assessment (and that of MILNET's sources) that the Iranian Air Force is less than functional.

Other CSIS data supports the fact that Iran has increased their modern aircraft numbers significantly since 1996.  From some 290 fighter/attack aircraft in inventory, the air force increased their planes by some 130+, all fairly modern and capable.  The Iranians have also added a small number (12) attack helicopters, and have plenty more on order.

The CSIS report is actually a little unclear on the actual numbers of aircraft, their notation for the numbers of aircraft in a squadron differs in the same paragraph and we have a hard time "pulling out" the numbers.  For instance in one paragraph the data reads

"Iran has seven air defense squadrons, with 2/20-25, -60 U.S. supplied F-14..."

The total could be up to to 50 F-14, but the "-60" is indecipherable unless this is some foreign export version called the "-60"?  In any case, the U.S. aircraft in inventory are very poorly maintained, and the CSIS report also states that the Iranians have not been able to fly with Phoenix missiles since high tech materials required to keep them running have been exhausted and the U.S. has seen to it that Iran has not been able to procure replacements.

There is an effort to develop an indigenous aircraft but that does not appear to be viable yet, as are Iranian attempts to license and build MIG-29s. They have purchased two squadrons of the MIG-29s, very capable aircraft, however, any adversary would simply draw them off and go around these two squadrons, probably to face far inferior aircraft in their stead.

One troublesome aspect to Iranian aircraft procurement is the purchase of enough Chinese F-7M aircraft to fill a squadron. These are fairly capable aircraft for the region.


50 F-14 (Air Defense) - Poorly maintained, Little/no AAM, gun only; 

6 MiG-29 (Air Defense) - Highly capable, heavy maintenance costs, fuel hungry; 

35 F-7M (Air Defense) - Fairly modern and capable;

260 F-4D/E (Attack/Defense) - Very poorly maintained, parts not available to Iran some in ME market;

260 F-5E/FII (Attack Defense) - Very poorly maintained, parts not available from U.S., some in ME market;

30 Su-24 (Attack) - Some parts purchases with Russia have taken place, these may be the best maintained of all Iranian aircraft;

7 Su-25K (Attack) - Seized during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out). May be operational but doubtful and

24 Mir F-1 (Attack/Defense) - Seized during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out)

The MILNET assessment is that the aircraft, while theoretically capable (especially in the case of the MiG-29 and F-14) are probably not maintained well enough and their pilots may lack the necessary combat skills in order to adequately pose a serious threat to their neighbors.  HOWEVER, having said that, it does not take a lot of skill to let loose an airborne cruise missile upon shipping in the Persian Gulf.  Thus the threat is perhaps in the direction of the water, rather than inland.  In another report, MILNET looks at how to
directly attack Iran in order to take out nuclear reactors and other nuclear development facilities.  In that analysis, we purposely assumed that if the Iranians were to put up an aircraft borne defense, it would serve the purpose of the attacking force to remove them from the picture, quickly and efficiently, and with only minimal losses.  It would serve both  to eliminate that airborne air defense as well as to "pull any remaining teeth" from the Iranian Air Force, and would therefore be welcomed strategically.


Middle East Perspectives - March 15, 2006


An acknowledged Middle East expert, dynamic speaker, author of "Ally to Adversary - An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace," and NBC News Middle East military analyst, retired intelligence officer Lt Col Rick Francona offers his thoughts and opinions on various Middle East topics.



Air-Defense revised, new tactics adopted

    “Looking back on experience from the NATO campaign against Serbia, one very interesting factor is the tactics pioneered by
Zoltan Dani.


    He really laid down what a modern SAM battery needs to do to survive modern warfare. Highlighted are key points. Reports specific to S-125 but applicable to any SAM.


    Based on experiences of the 1981 Syrian War, constant relocation of all assets was key to survival of Dani's unit, the 3rd missile detachment of the 250th serbian air defense battalion. Although the SA-3 / "S-125M Neva" system is not a mobile SAM complex per design, it's solid fueled missiles are transportable in near combat ready condition (in fact the Polish military created a mobile SA-3 version on T-72 tank chassis in the 1990s).

    Therefore Lt. Col. Dani trained his SA-3 unit to achieve a 90 minute equipment break-down time with minimal lighting provided for better camouflage, one hour better than the standard time. Further set-up and break-down time reductions were achieved by reducing the SA-3 unit's number of active 5P73 launchers and V-601P missiles to just 2x2 from the original 4x4 configuration.

    This reduction in missile capability was justified, because of the expected strictly limited time slots and occasions where a serbian SAM battery could open fire in face of a tremendous NATO Wild Weasel capability, with any hope of self-preservation. The lean use of SAM missiles also became a necessity later on, as the initial March 24th, 1999, 20:20 NATO air strike destroyed 100pcs of ready to use V-601P spare missiles in two concrete vaults at the Jakovo SAM base.


    Lt. Col. Dani made it a strict field rule that the SA-3's UNV type fire control radar can be turned on for a maximum of 2 x 20 seconds in combat, after which the battery's equipment must be immediately broken down and trucked to a pre-prepared alternative launch site, whether or not any missile has been fired. This rule proved essential, because other Serbian AAA units emitting high-frequency radiation for any longer periods or forgetting to relocate, were hit by AGM-88 HARM missile counter-strikes from NATO aircraft, suffering radar equipment and personnel losses, even getting completely obliterated in some cases.


    In order to train personnel operate efficiently under such pressures, Zoltan Dani obtained access to an "Accord" electronic signal simulator, which allowed the SA-3 radar and guidance crew practice combat scenarios based on imitated engagements. Several soldiers were removed from position both during the pre-war practice drills and wartime guard shifts, when they proved unable to cope with the psychological stress of being targeted by enemy aircraft.

    It was decided two missiles will be launched against any target near simultaneously, in order to maximize hit probability. Unusually, launches were to be conducted against NATO aircraft that have already accomplished their ground strike missions and were about to leave serbian airspace.


    Dani's mobility rule was strictly observed in his unit, with the trucks collecting more than 100.000km in the odometer during the 78 days of Kosovo War, as they constantly shuttled missiles, radars and equipment between the dozen alternative launch sites, most of them embankments left over from already phased out SA-2 (S-75) units.

    Radar sets obtained from confiscated Iraqi MiG-21 planes were planted around the SAM sites to serve as active emitter decoys, which diverted some anti-radiation missiles from the actual targets. (Dozens of Iraqi MiG-21/23 warplanes, sent to Yugoslavia for industrial overhaul, were seized in 1991, after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.) Retired SAM radar sets were used as optical decoys, left at well-known military bases to lure NATO planes waste munition on worthless targets. Owing to these measures, Dani's unit evaded 23 incoming HARM missiles, all of which impacted off-site with insignificant or zero damages.


    General surveillance of NATO aircraft was provided by vintage P-18 radar sets, which used vacuum tubes and a large rotating Yagi antenna grid for meter-band illumination. Under optimal conditions the soviet made P-18 was able to plot large-RCS aircraft from 125 to 200km, depending on the target's size, but with an high range inaccuracy of several hundred meters.

    Zoltan Dani tuned (his P-18) to the lowest possible frequency and further (replaced four major capacitors in the electronics) achieved an even longer wavelenght, hoping that meter band waves will reflect from the inside of targets, rendering stealth aircraft skin technology ineffective. In practice his modified P-18 provided stable plot of F-117 movements from just 25km, which was useful when combined with the comparatively short missile range of the SA-3 air defense complex. Furthermore, the P-18 meter band radar could be kept almost constantly emitting, since most NATO radar warning receiver devices did not cover such a very low frequency band.


    Findings from this experience will be tested in training and mock engagements, tested and full integration will be done by 4th Quarter 2013. Key points will be made SOP.

    The armed forces will hold a military exercise simulating a massive air attack, with the entire air force being the opposing force to the Air-Defence Corps of Iran. The air force will be simulating a massive shock and awe campaign. Ground troops will also participate and train and simulated shootdowns of parachuting a pilot to evade and escape, will be organized. Every AD formation will train against cruise missiles, fabric targets towed by fighters. The exercise to be named Prophet's Bow is to be held early 4Q 2013.


Iran (Surfinbird) - May 6, 2010 04:53 PM (GMT)

CSIS Iran’s Developing Military


    “The Iranian Navy has some 18,000 men. According to the IISS, this total includes a two brigade marine force of some 2,600 men and a 2,000-man naval aviation force. It has bases at Bandar-e Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bander-e Anzelli, Chah Bahar, Bander-e Mahshahar, and Bander-e Khomeini. This gives it bases opposing most of the Saudi coast. It has 3 submarines, 3 frigates, 2 corvettes, 10 missile patrol craft, 7 mine warfare ships, 44 coastal and inshore patrol craft, and 9-10 amphibious ships. Its naval aviation branch is one of the few air elements in any Gulf Navy, and has 5 maritime patrol aircraft, and 19 armed helicopters. When combined with the IRGC naval branch, this is a total maritime strength of 38,000 men with significant capabilities for both regular naval and asymmetric naval warfare” (Ref. From Center for Strategic and International Studies - By Anthony H. Cordesman).



20,000 personnel
5,000 Marines


Iranian Navy - From Center for Strategic and International Studies - By Anthony H. Cordesman



Kilo 636: 3
Qaaem: 0(1)
Nahang: 1
Ghadir: 7
Yugo: 4


"...Iran has obtained new anti-ship missiles and missile patrol craft from China, midget submarines from North Korea, submarines from Russia, and modern mines."


3 Submarine - Kilo (Type 877) Diesel Electric - Spd kts 17 sub & 10 surf Armament - Six 530mm torp tubes, Guided and autonomous Torpedoes with Sonar, passive homing, active homing or wire guided (one wired at a time); Wide array of mines; AA Missile launcher in sail for SA-14 Strela Missile. Sub has surface range of 3-6 K miles, and 400 miles submerged. Subs are said to need significant refits - ex-Soviet


Non-Nuclear Submarines


A submarine of Project 877 embodies one of the most successful series in non-nuclear submarine shipbuilding of the end of the XX century. Export modifications - projects 877E and 877EKM - were designed based on this submarine. The most advance engineering solutions of that time and available experience of operation of export modifications of submarines of Project 641 (Foxtrot) (I641, I641K) in various regions of the World ocean were implemented in these submarines.


Kilo Class Type 877EKM showing two torpedo tubes above the water line. 


SSK Kilo Class (Type 877EKM) Attack Submarine, Russia


The Russian Kilo Class submarine first entered service in the early 1980's. It was designed by the Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau, St Petersburg. Subsequent developments have led to the current production versions, the Type 877EKM and most recently, Type 636. The submarines are constructed at the Admiralty Shipyard in St Petersburg. 24 Kilo Class submarines are in service in the Russian Navy (most of the older designs). They have also been exported to Iran, China, India, Poland, Romania and Algeria. China has two Type 877EKM, Iran has three Type 877EKM and India has ten Type 877EKM (Sindughosh Class). The Type 877EKM is designed for anti-submarine (ASW) and anti-surface ship (ASuW) warfare.



















Iran History and Military


Operations Evening Light and Eagle Claw, A Sailors tale of his Tour of duty in the U.S. Navy (August 1977 to February 1983)


A Sailors tale of his Tour of duty in the U.S. Navy - Operation Evening Light And Eagle Claw -


Book - ISBN NO.


EBook - ISBN NO.



Operations Evening Light and Eagle Claw (24 April 1980) Iran and Air Arm History (1941 to Present)


Operations Evening Light and Eagle Claw (24 April 1980) Iran and Air Arm History (1941 to Present)